Abstract: J. Šmajs' concept of evolutionary ontology has attracted much attention in recent years especially in Czech and Slovak academic circles, yet it remains, as some of its proponents claim, undervalued in Britain and the US. Even in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, there are, in addition to its strong supporters, several authors who almost a priori reject the concept, pointing to several questionable, contradictory or even mutually exclusive or self-refuting arguments. In this paper, mainly based on a comprehensive analysis of the first part of Šmajs' book, Evoluční ontologie kultury a problém podnikání (2012) [Evolutionary Ontology of Culture and The Issues Of Business], we attempt to demonstrate that the opponents of Šmajs' concept are closer to the truth, since the concept, we believe, is just another variation on the extreme escalation of philosophical naturalism.
At the outset -the inevitable methodological and "strategic" definitions All philosophizing, if it wants to be fair, constructive or even meaningful, should meet certain criteria. It should not be inconsistent, contradictory or isolated from the contemporary and historical scientific and philosophical context, even if it is critical or dismissive of it. If we evaluate the individual contribution of a particular author, we also have to take into account his previous literary works and analyze the writing within the context of the author's whole work, because only then can we objectively assess how the author has changed and developed his attitude to the issues and questions previously raised. Therefore, in our paper we will attempt to define the core of Šmajs' evolutionary philosophical-ontological system, then we will note how he interprets and develops the main points of his concept in his latest writing on evolutionary ontology, and finally, we will try to prove that even in this work he does not significantly cross the epistemic borders of his earlier writing, and indeed he presents himself as a very radical philosophical naturalist. We will not analyze the second part of Šmajs' book, allegedly devoted to the problem of entrepreneurship, firstly because in his critique of traditional economics Šmajs completely ignores the knowledge base of environmental economics (Wiesmeth 2012) and economic sociology (Trigilia 2002) , and secondly, calls for politicians to provide full employment for all employable people (Šmajs optimizing and, if necessary, altering any new evolutionary form in response to frequent feedback; Šmajs, Krob 1991, 80) . It is therefore perfect. On the other hand, cultural evolution is secondary, quick, unnatural and inefficient in forming things (since it is not developed, and does not alter things in response to feedback from the biosphere; ibid., 81). It is therefore imperfect. In any case, it cannot be a direct continuation of natural evolution, but is just a partial, ephemeral, and doomed subsystem of the terrestrial biosphere (Šmajs 2006, 46) , which, as the highest organized subsystem of cosmic reality, has the full realizable evolutionary potential. And even after an extinction of culture, hostile to nature, it is able after a certain time to re-create apparently much wiser beings than man. Worst of all, with the help of cultural information, since people are governed by their own biologically given aggressive adaptive strategy, they are very effectively able to intervene in nature at the intermediate (or macroscopic) level and by creating (or producing) a rapidly growing cultural covering (the technosphere), they significantly reduce and destroy the biosphere itself.
The growing and continually perfecting technosphere becomes the source of an inappropriate and false technooptimism, preventing people from realizing that the information (or knowledge) they have acquired is drawn mainly from the explicate (surface or enfolded) natural order (or layer) , while the implicate (deep or "unfolded") order, either, remains unavailable to them forever, or after their incompetent interventions, will jeopardize their very existence (for example, due to some unconsidered genetic experiments). And because people are, and will always remain, essentially biological creatures, dependent on a functioning biosphere, they will eventually have to, if they want to survive, help the biosphere and considerably limit the growth of the human population and also change the structure of the socio-cultural burden, and thus (Šmajs 2006, 74) break up the massive globalized, strongly energizing and market integrated sociosphere (and technosphere) into smaller, more autonomous and adaptable cultural units (or communities), which will not only lessen the burden on the biosphere, but will also provide the necessary time for it to recover. It is important to note that all this applies to the core of Šmajs' gradually constituted philosophical system. However, in his first two major publications (Cetl, Hubík, Šmajs 1990; Šmajs, Krob 1991) we often find claims which are in stark contrast with these ideas, such as the idea (also developed by Cetl et al. 1990 ) that culture "is a qualitatively higher means of organizing reality than nature" and "the previous development of material culture or technology, can be considered a continuation of the evolution of non-living terrestrial nature, similar to the development of the biosphere" (Cetl et al.1990, 19, 70) . It is, however, true that in the case of technology, the evolution is just very specific and/or secondary (ibid.).
Universe, man and nature in Šmajs' recent book on evolutionary ontology
Over the past few decades Šmajs' evolutionary-ontological concept has faced sometimes mild and other times strong, constructive or even preconceived "mistaken" criticism. In his last book J. Šmajs (2012) responded to this criticism and tried to increase his arguments (or opinions) but, he neglected and did not thematise some of his concepts, as defending them would obviously require much more time and energy. Paradoxically, he once again defended his evolutionary-ontological concept against biased (or incompetent) critics, but he also exposed the concept's weaknesses and ultimately opened up the way to serious, comprehensive criticism of his work. We wish to look at how he describes natural and cultural evolution, human nature and nature itself in his book. In describing them, however, we will initially refrain from making any critical comments in order to give readers unfamiliar with Šmajs' lifelong work space to form their own opinions. Natural (global cosmic or biotic) evolution versus cultural evolution First, we will deal with natural evolution, which Šmajs (2012, 36) defines as being complex, natural and globally cosmic. This contrasts with his definition of sociocultural evolution, which is only partial, unnatural and teleological. Šmajs does not hesitate, even implicitly, to identify evolution with God, boldly stating on the next page (ibid., 37) that "via cultural evolution man opposes Evolution and God, both capitalized." Not surprisingly, a few pages further on (ibid., 40) he considers Skolimowski's claim that "Evolution is so perfect in its activity that it could be called divine" to be factually correct. Right on the next page, however, he states that it is difficult to declare so unambiguously and clearly that natural evolution has attained such perfection, because in addition to natural evolution, which Šmajs considers "as a 'primary' (ontically constructive) cosmic process", there is also the "'secondary' (destructive) process of cosmic entropy." Fortunately, as Šmajs further observes: "Both of these processes are intricately connected and operate relatively independently even in ontic opposition and cooperation." The proof of his apparent effort to understand natural evolution as a unified process can be found in a subtle footnote (ibid., 60), where he agrees with M. Král, who says that elementary particles, atomic nuclei, atoms, even molecules belong to "the genetic memory of the anorganic world."
In this book cultural evolution, or indeed culture itself, acquires additional meanings-it can be understood (ibid., 6) as the technologically sophisticated, purely material base of human society, as (ibid., 20) a whole generated "by collective human activity, an implicate order of culture, i.e. which integrates and directs it against nature," and finally and, probably the most preferable definition, as a single integrated whole, consisting of people and a technological covering they have produced. As we can see on page 144 of Šmajs' book, technology is defined as "a functional system, which is not integrated just by nature, but along with it," as Šmajs further underlines, "even exclusively by culture, i.e. (in the end) by man as a biological species." The fact that Šmajs (ibid., 178) considers man to be a constitutive element of culture confirms his claim that the technologically highly developed culture "today includes seven billion people", and not only does it not have "space to expand, but [it] does not have enough resources for simple reproduction." The only possible way out of this situation is therefore according to Šmajs (ibid., 122 ) the early theoretical preparation "for a dignified cultural retreat," i.e. if we are to elaborate on Šmajs' vague notion, then it means considerably reducing our cultural activities.
Human nature
As the reader has surely noticed, Šmajs regards man as a being whose behavior is primarily biologically determined. On page 25 of the book he, first of all, asks, "in which existence man can live happily in accordance with his own biological nature (in accordance with his conservative genome)" and at the end of the book (ibid., 206) he directly states that he sees human nature as "an aggregate of relatively constant traits of our biological species i.e. approximately everything that the human genome contains and determines." According to him (ibid., 178), human nature thus defined "has not changed for at least one hundred thousand years," and we can say that man, defined in accordance with evolutionary hypotheses, developed (ibid., 31) "from Miocene apes... long before the emergence of culture." Despite all the cultural achievements (ibid., 93) man remains a randomly formed biological species, that "like other species cannot live permanently in an artificial environment" and has virtually "no right to pervade the entire Earth with culture." Culture operates as a kind of alien and parasitic tumor on the otherwise healthy body of Mother Earth (due to the destructive effects it has on terrestrial wildlife). Culture also prevents further development of the human genome, because as Šmajs observes in the style of Social Darwinism (ibid., 113): "Culture not only pollutes nature, but also protects us from the positive effects of natural selection on the human genome. Consequently, it is not a natural continuation of evolution." An even more interesting argument can be found at the end of the book (ibid., 224): "... human specificity does not lie primarily in the fact that man can talk, think, learn and believe. It lies in the way man is the only species to have managed to create a transpersonal external body-culture." In keeping with this argument we find another equally surprising statement on page 74 where he says that "proud anthropocentric philosophy" will sooner or later have to recognize that "neither liberty nor human rights are enshrined in the human genome". However, we believe that this runs counter to his other argument (ibid., 164), which holds that the conflict between the technosphere and the biosphere "is therefore a test of man, i.e. a critical examination of his rational ability to adapt his, only partially genetically prescribed, behavior to the new planetary conditions."
And finally -nature itself
Since in Šmajs' book nature also takes the form of a sort of untouchable deity or absolutely morally virtuous Madonna (Mother Earth), it is only natural that it should be blessed with the most diverse and noble designations and attributes. Apart from providing an almost standard conception of nature relating to natural evolution as described above, Šmajs (ibid., 6, 69) , defines nature as a natural being as an independent, spontaneously evolving system, "which has its own evolutionary logic and creative antientropic direction." In this definition of nature Šmajs distinguishes two strata: "Nature in general -the cosmos" and "terrestrial nature" (ibid., 69-70). Of much greater importance is the fact that nature itself takes all the definitions of biological evolution or life in general, which then become not only the primary or main definition of natural evolution and nature, but also of natural being itself, i.e. the highest possible value, to which everything must be subordinated. That is the conclusion from the author's bold claim: "Life is in fact superior to man and culture, and beyond freedom and human rights" (ibid., 74). According to Šmajs (ibid., 121) nature is truly "the highest value and has absolute power over people and cultures, and is the natural mother and home to all people and cultures." As such, it certainly deserves our unconditional love and all the positive adjectives with which Šmajs repeatedly endows it, mainly exalting (ibid., 100) "its soft natural order, beauty and balance."
With a few conceptual extensions and almost conventional semantic shifts we find ourselves in an almost miraculous world where non-living cosmic bodies can in a strict sense multiply and reproduce like rats, mice or tapeworms, since (ibid., 148): "any potentially life-giving star (including our Sun) cannot in fact live as long as the entire universe." In the almost avatar world where wise and fair Mother Earth, in an ecophilosophical "ghetto" frequently referred to as Gaia 1 , will finally punish all those who greedily and brazenly violate its unwritten but very rigid laws, as we can see for example on page 72 where "the Earth as a whole (Gaia) creates an artfully arranged organism with internal constitutive information." Here hypothetical Gaia (ibid., 72) is subsequently identified along with the whole biosphere as "probably the least relatively autonomous system capable of long-term upward development in time," where "subsystems, individuals, populations, biocenosis and culture are temporary and non-autonomous, dependent on the prosperity of the biotic whole." And finally, in the world (ibid., 120), where the anti-natural economy "resembles an artificial necrophilous zone inside Earth's natural economy," which, as Šmajs would probably say, knows best how to utilize and distribute its natural and spiritual values or goods.
Scientific realism and philosophical naturalism
Having introduced Šmajs' evolutionary ontology and its most important concepts (or ideas) in detail, we can now go on to describe the philosophical "background" or context we shall be assessing it in relation to. The context is the ideas of V. Černík and J. Viceník (2011) , which seem to us to be very appropriate, since V. Černík has reviewed several publications by J. Šmajs (e.g. Šmajs, Krob 2003) and therefore should be familiar with his evolutionary ontology. According to Černík and Viceník (2011, 210) realism is "the philosophical view in which the external world becomes objective reality in relation to the subject of knowledge and action, and it can be known, although only partially and gradually." However, there are several kinds of philosophical realism. Naive realism (ibid., 211), which believes "that things are as we perceive them," and does not distinguish between "things in themselves and things as they appear to an observer, between the essence of thing and the form in which it is expressed, between the real and the apparent movement of things." Furthermore, there is critical realism (ibid.), which "acknowledges that perception is limited and can be misleading" and that comprehensive and exact truth is "difficult to reach." It also clearly distinguishes between "things in themselves and things as they appear, the essence of thing and the form of its expression, the real and apparent movement of things," and therefore it realizes "the importance of the constructing of idealized objects and ideal types of model objects, which are necessary for the formulation of idealized laws and idealized theories."
And finally, scientific realism, as Černík and Viceník (ibid., 212, 213) argue is "an improved, more advanced version of critical realism". Unlike some critical realists, representatives of scientific realism do not consider "the essence of things to be immutable and forever given," but rather concentrate "on analyzing internal differences and contradictions, which are immanent to the essence of things, and therefore on exploring their potential to change." They focus on exploring changes in the historically evolving essence of things, including, as once again we would like to add, the changes in the historically given human nature or essence. Even more interesting is their distinction between methodological naturalism and anti-naturalism. Černík and Viceník (ibid., 335) start by defining methodological monism as a philosophical and methodological concept, which "acknowledges the identity, or unity of fundamental principles, imperatives and methods of natural and social sciences." They highlight the "difference between reductionist and nonreductionist methodological monism", which lies in the fact that reductionist methodological monism directly identifies principles, imperatives and methods in natural sciences with those used in social sciences "and tries to reduce social science methodology into natural science methodology." Whereas non-reductionist methodological monism only recognizes the unity (but not identity) of natural and social sciences and therefore focuses especially on the "analysis of specific particularities of natural and social science methodology."
Reductionist methodological monism thus creates a semblance of identity between all natural and social systems, and we cannot wonder that it has provoked a very sharp counterreaction in the form of methodological anti-naturalism that (ibid., 338) "promotes the idea of incommensurable principles, imperatives and methods of scientific work in the natural and social sciences and humanities," stressing "the particular uniqueness of the humanities," which (ibid., 338, 339) reportedly "do not use the method of scientific explanations, but the method of understanding or hermeneutic interpretation." The antinomy of methodological naturalism and anti-naturalism as defined here is very interesting particularly in its origin, (ibid., 343) as it "grows out of the dichotomy between body and soul," in the epistemic "area" where clusters of repeatedly solved and as yet unsolved problems have accumulated during the history of philosophy and science. The situation has been very aptly, albeit rather succinctly, described by O. Beran (2011, 248) , who stated that there are several possible solutions regarding the attempts of some analytic philosophers to define the purely physicalist view of mental states and unambiguously assign them to particular processes at the neuronal level. Apart from their rectilinear identity, their supervenience, where "every event in the mind is based on the event in the brain without the detailed explanation of this relationship, so there is no straight forward causality expected," there is also the rather nebulous idea of the emergence of "mental states of neuronal systems". This, however, provides a way not only of solving the psycho-physical problem, but also of realistically assessing the actual epistemic qualities and values of Šmajs' evolutionary ontology.
As J. Schenk (2011, 27-58) stated in his precise analysis of emergence, the concept of emergence is not only key to sociological issues, where disputes continue on the methodological advantages of sociological individualism and holism, but also to natural science and social science issues, because each science must solve the problem of distinguishing the particular research and/or ontological levels, directly connected with the problem of generating their system qualities. In summary, each science has to solve the problem of whether it is more appropriate to base descriptions on global systemic properties, which then "give" individual system components their (potential and realistic) behavior, or to base them on the behavior of individual elements, and on a thorough analysis and quantification etc. and then deduce and predict the qualities of the whole in its superiority. According to J. Schenk (ibid., 37) we must first distinguish between epistemological and ontological emergence, where the former, which "arises" out of emergent (previously non-existent) properties, is simply the result of the method used to describe the system as a whole, while in the second case, emergence actually "refers to features of the systems or the wholes," because the "features are characterized by causal capacities that are irreducible to any internal causal capacities of the parts or to the relationships between the parts" and it is therefore evident that it is an emergent quality of "the system as such." At this point, however, major problems or methodological dilemmas arise, because as J. Schenk further observes (ibid., 37ff) in ontological emergence not only a strong and weak, but a semi-strong variant can be defined as well.
Schenk subsequently refers to M. Bedau (ibid., 37, 38) who states that the emergent phenomena are characterized by two very useful, albeit mutually exclusive (or completely incompatible) features-"they are somehow constituted by elementary, underlying... processes and generated from them" and "they are in some way independent of elementary, underlying... processes." In strong (or holistic) emergence, the solution is sought by predicating an emergent property supervenient to all parts of an object O and thus able to show (ibid., 38) a "determining retroactive... effect on the behavior patterns of object O parts," while in weak emergence a more pragmatic approach is selected, as it is expected that the macrostates of system S are its "... structural properties which are entirely constituted by microstates," upon which Bedau then notes (ibid., 39, 40) that macrostate P of system S can be deduced only on the basis of simulating microdynamic D and the external conditions of system S. However, as J. Schenk continues (ibid., 44, 45), from a purely methodological point of view even the weak emergence is not satisfactory because some of its applications (e.g. multi-agent modelling) "do not include social causality or a reverse causal effect," so instead of weak emergence, Sawyer's semi-strong emergence must be introduced i.e. nonreductive individualism (ibid., 48, 49) assuming a "softer" and wider reverse causality, which "can only be changed through changes in human behavior."
Although the above passage may appear to the uninitiated reader as idle theorizing, it nevertheless allows us to address the issue of philosophical naturalism and anti-naturalism more closely than, for example, F. Engels' dialectical materialism and its successors (Zubkov et al. 1981) . This is because it is not a simple statement of the existence of various forms of motion of matter (henceforth as FMM), which tend to be selected on the basis of their specific system elements and laws, linking them together in one immanent whole, but like Ellis' scientific-realism theory of natural kinds (2001, 2002) , in this case as well, ideas and concepts are sought and formulated enabling us to explain the genesis of one form of motion of matter in relation to another one and convincingly prove its ontic uniqueness. Similarly, it is true that within the dialectical-materialist theory of FMM it is possible to grasp how the lower forms of motion are included within higher ones, how the new immanent substance is constituted within the previous one and also how the two different or contradictory moments are unified in one substance, without violating the rules of formal logic. As Černík and Viceník emphasize (ibid., 217ff.), Hegel not only formulated a negative, irrational and paradoxical dialectic, but also a positive, rational and logically correct dialectic that avoids any logical contradiction, which is, as we shall see, unfortunately, a standard part of all Šmajs' evolutionary-ontological writing mentioned thus far.
Natural (global cosmic or biotic) evolution seems non-existent
In the next three subsections, we will focus on a critical analysis of the key terms of Šmajs' evolutionary ontology outlined above, recalling that in his last evolutionaryontological book he omitted or did not thematize some parts of his theory and therefore he has left it open to serious, comprehensive criticism, that should take note of the omitted parts. Paradoxically, it is Šmajs' most frequently used concept of evolution which we consider to be crucial to and "omitted" in his evolutionary ontology. Šmajs does not distinguish evolution from the related concepts of "growth", "advancement", "progress" or "development", which are in some way overlapped or "identified" with it. As we know, Šmajs only devoted one of his publications (Šmajs, Krob 2003, 178-182) to a more systematic definition of "evolution". On page 180 he states that movement is a broader concept than evolution, because "everything that evolves, moves, but not everything that moves, evolves," and subsequently he identifies as evolving systems only those which are far from being thermodynamic equilibriums, i.e. those, which are either increasingly distant from it (while enlarging in size, information and order), or increasingly close to it (while shrinking in size, information and order).
In the same publication (ibid., 181), however, he identifies evolution with upward development and with anti-entropic processes, while in some of his other books he has tried to define unambiguous criteria for the development of non-living and living nature. As he states (Šmajs 2008, 59 ), during evolution each "diversified whole" (developmental level) "uses its limited evolutionary source more efficiently due to its increasing order." Evolution not only generates but also destroys its "components, subsystems and units." In his philosophical work evolution thus has two mutually incompatible peculiarities. It becomes creator of all that is highly organized (or improved through evolution), yet, it also becomes a destroyer. Worse still, the properties of biological evolution are transferred to all the processes in the cosmos, whether non-living, living or social, by being included in the concept (and process) of natural evolution, and since Šmajs consistently avoids using and differentiating between the terms "growth", "advancement", "progress" and "development", we do not have an accurate definition of the criteria under which we could at least provisionally identify some systems as being more developed and others as less developed. Any serious criticism of his philosophical system, therefore, must begin not only with a definition of these terms relating to evolution, but with a precise definition of credible developmental criteria as well.
We will rely on the philosophical ideas and concepts of M. Skalský (1991) , V.V. Rubcov and A.D. Ursul (1984) , and V. Černík (1986) , who have focused simply on precisely defining these developmental criteria. According to M. Skalský (1991, 78, 79) 2 we do not have any serious reasons to consider "the process of the expansion of the Universe, i.e. a change in its space-time scale" as "the correlate of development" (or progressive or ascending developmental branch), because distinct mechanical movement is far removed from development itself. Skalský (1991) believes that it is equally incorrect and questionable to define development as a transition from the lower to the higher, although this fact is allegedly represented as an elementary tautology, while highlighting growth in the complexity of the system may mislead us into "an uncritical preference for the quantitative aspect" of development rather than the qualitative. It is therefore preferable to combine development with growth in the rate of the system's self-determination, which depends on whether and to what extent the system "determines itself" its own existence, i.e. actively brings about its own existence, or "passively (statically) sets the conditions for it to come into existence, i.e. selfdetermination." And on this basis, we can then distinguish between the two contrasting types of systems-relatively passive systems with a very limited substance-energy and information exchange with the surroundings, and relatively active systems, which in turn enter into an intensive exchange, especially since they are able in a more "sophisticated" way to integrate their more autonomous, sovereign or "fully-fledged" structural elements (or parts).
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Another alternative is to combine progress and regress with the increase or the decrease in the richness in the content of the object, as Rubcov and Ursul did (1984, 76, 77) following A. N. Severcov, when they defined progress as the acquisition of new qualities (and the enrichment of the content), in which "in an extreme case the possibility of further growth in content richness is not diminished," and regress is understood as a loss of content qualities "which in an extreme case does not reduce the possibility of their further diminishing." And subsequently they began to distinguish not only between "pure" progress and "pure" regress 4 but also between progressive regress (in which the loss of the content qualities of the object is associated with the possibility of a further increase in its content richness) and regressive progress (in which the acquisition of new qualities is associated with the increased possibility that they will be subsequently lost). And finally they distinguished between relative progress, "an increase in the content richness of the object in its current status, in comparison with its previous status" and absolute progress as "an increase in the possibility of further magnification of content richness." V. Černík (1986, 432, 433) has defined the main types of organic reproduction in systems, including simple reproduction, where an organic system restores the basic conditions of its existence in the same quality and although its reproduction is cyclical in nature, it should not be seen as a circular movement, because in this case the basic conditions of the system are renewed in a new form.
Furthermore, there is extended reproduction, in which the organic "system enables the extended reproduction of its basic conditions" and "the moment when they are produced anew takes precedence over the moment when they are destroyed," and consequently systems of this type of cyclic movement are necessarily "associated with a progressive irreversible sequence in the shape of a development spiral," while their actual development "heads from more probable, less organized states to less probable, more organized states, from lower to higher forms of organization." In addition to these, there is also a narrowed type of reproduction, in which the organic system fails to enable even the simple reproduction of its basic conditions because "the moment they are destroyed prevails over the moment they are produced anew". Consequently, the quantity and quality irreversibly and "regressively changes, and the form of their unification weakens" so much so that "the system decays into subsystems and individuals, which lose their specific nature and cease to perform their function in the system." So we can factually and clearly distinguish between evolution (as a developmental process found only at the level of living forms), development as a whole (with its ascending and descending phases), relative and absolute progress (as ascending development or simply progressive development) and relative and absolute regress (as descending development or, "regressive development"), 5 but we can also point out that Šmajs' distinction between natural and cultural evolution is inaccurate and futile.
Taking into account the principal differences between the simple, extended and narrowed reproduction of organic systems (SRS, ERS and NRS) we can see that it is not possible for two opposing, or connected and "cooperating" processes of natural evolution and cosmic entropy to exist, as J. Šmajs claims (2012, 41) . There is only one process of cosmic progressive development, or development in the cosmos, in which single forms of motion of matter are gradually formed in increasingly smaller regions and at shorter intervals 6 with increasingly larger and increasingly organized structural elements. These structural elements are increasingly able to include the content richness of the formed FMM, so there is only one intracosmic process comprising two opposing, but also mutually self-assuming, moments of "pure" production and "pure" destruction. And besides, there is the development of the (observed) universe as a unique physical whole with a clearly defined beginning and end, with its own structural (or substantial) elements, which during development goes through stages of expanded or narrowed reproduction, but which retains its structural and substantial identity up to the end. And finally, there is something even more interesting-(multi)universe development in the true sense of the word, i.e. the highly characterized development of the universe as a whole, where separate universes "progressively" emerge from vacuum spacetime "foam", but without continuously improving or degenerating, as this kind of totality can be obtained only through simple reproduction. 7 5 And to identify de facto the concept of "progress" with the concept of "progressive development" as in English, which is an appropriate language for comparison. "Development" refers to the progress or regress of an organic system, while the term "growth" refers to a rather simple, linear or purely "mechanical" increase. 6 Including, as convincingly argued by I. F. Zubkov (1981, 134-153), physical, atomic, chemical, mineralogical, petrological, planetary, stellar-planetary, geological, biological and social FMM. 7 At first glance it may seem that this is very strong metaphysical or even natural philosophical speculation. However, we find support for our ideas in the current philosophical literature, for example, P. Cmorej (2001, 102ff.) in his very consequent logical analysis proves that there are indeed essential empirical properties and substantially identical possible worlds or universes. B. Ellis (2002, 5) in If we, on the basis of this conceptual system, recognize at the same time the existence of FMM and natural kinds, we can immediately see the incorrectness of Šmajs' distinction between natural and cultural evolution. In this case, against culture, i.e. social FMM the entire file of FMM is purposefully and tendentiously constructed because this file not only preceded social FMM but had over a much larger time span many more opportunities to demonstrate its evolutionary potential, dynamics or adaptability in the widest possible sense of the word. As a result, culture should not be opportunistically identified at one point with the material base of the society as a whole (Šmajs 2012, 6) , and sometimes with the whole generated by "human collective activity" (ibid., 20) , and at other times with man as a biological species (ibid., 144) or (ibid., 178) even with seven billion people and their technical "covering", but it should be perceived and defined as what it most likely is, i.e. a set of specifically human information, knowledge, abilities and skills that enables people to produce not only technology and art, but the entire material and production base of society and thus fully manifest their bio-psycho-socio-cultural essence (or nature) in all its structural variety, but also in its historical specificity and at the same time-in its developmental limitation, partiality and ephemerality.
Human nature (or essence) is thus not biological, but bio-psycho-socio-cultural
As we indicated above, Šmajs' claims about human nature (or essence) are barely mutually compatible or even highly contradictory, as at first he defines man as a purely biological creature, whose behavior is limited or determined mainly by the content of the human genome (ibid., 206), then he refuses to consider human speech and thought as the utmost of human properties, which help people to create culture (ibid., 224), and finally, he admits (ibid., 164) that human behavior is "only partially genetically prescribed". However, his "fumbling around" over this issue, is certainly not surprising, because as H. Arendt stated (1958, 10) , "... nothing entitles us to assume that man has a nature of essence in the same sense as other things. In other words, if we have a nature of essence, then surely only god could know and define it, and the first prerequisite would be that he be able to speak about a 'who' as though it were a 'what'." J. Bonner's words sound similarly uncertain and cautious (in Goldsmith 1994, 87): "... it is not clear that one will ever be able to determine to what extent any human action is genetically or culturally determined." However, there are authors who are completely clear about this issue and very vehemently and rigidly try to persuade the others of their truth (or "truth"). Among them, E. O. Wilson (1993) in particular stands out; he is in no doubt that human behavior is primarily biologically determined.
At some points, we cannot help thinking that it was very particularly Wilson's book On Human Nature that was the source of information from which J. Šmajs has throughout his philosophical career drawn the most basic knowledge. After all, Wilson also considers a similar way, argues that "the laws of nature that describe the causal powers of things cannot be contingent" i.e. other than they are, and openly criticizes the very theory of possible worlds (ibid., 117), due to the fact that the theory does not recognize the existence of intrinsic modal properties, only an epistemic tool "without any ontological relevance," because the "actual world is a modal world with inbuilt natural necessities." mankind as another biological species, as he notes that (1993, 13) , "The first is that no species, ours included, possesses a purpose beyond the imperatives created by its genetic history," and further adds the "human mind is constructed in a way that locks it inside this fundamental constraint and forces it to make choices with a purely biological instrument." A few pages further on (ibid., 27) this very uncompromising sociobiologist returns to complicated and incorruptible reality, when he is forced to accept the dualistic determination of human behavior, noting that: "Each person is molded by an interaction of his environment, especially his cultural environment, with the genes that affect his social behavior." Wilson understands culture rather specifically as he identifies it only (ibid., 37ff.) with the use of simple (i.e. not systematically produced and intricately designed) tools, which he believes is also within the competence of chimpanzees, and so nothing prevents him from concluding (ibid., 39) that "the apes have managed to cross the threshold of cultural evolution, and to have moved on into the human domain." Only people, nevertheless, (ibid., 90) have managed throughout cultural and not (only) biological evolution to build a modern civilization with all its conquests.
However, since chimps do not fly into space or sit on the UN Security Council and oceanologists have so far failed to discover dolphin cities or highways, 8 we consider Wilson's sociobiological theory as a whole to be an irrelevant theoretical concept, despite the fact that some of his sub-arguments are accurate and original. This is because unlike B. F. Poršnev (1979) , Wilson has no idea that for the genesis of human language, mind and culture, simple imitation is certainly not enough (Wilson, ibid., 37ff.) , but it is necessary (Poršnev 1979, 269-339, 400, 410, 451) to fundamentally rebuild the first signal system as a second one, as occurred within the family of pre-human troglodytes through neurological and behavioral processes such as instinctive imitation, inadequate reflexes, interdiction and generalized interdiction. On the other hand, we positively evaluate Wilson's subsequent finding (ibid., 101) that "there is no evidence of some widespread unified aggressive instinct" (in humans, but also in other species -I. M. and R. B.), as it sharply contrasts with Šmajs' argument that man is a biologically determined creature with an aggressive animal adaptive strategy. We also appreciate another of Wilson's arguments (ibid., 174) , that people prefer to get rid of problems with the help of binary classification, as is often seen in Šmajs' evolutionaryontological writing.
If we want to be completely fair to Šmajs and his evolutionary ontology, we also need to add that Wilson's ideas are increasingly perceived in the contemporary philosophy of biology as scientific "folklore" that is increasingly being overtaken, rather than a science in the true sense of the word, which fulfills its basic epistemic functions (whether descriptive, predictive or explicative). Greater emphasis is now being placed on a clear definition of the boundaries that separate humans, as a clearly demarcated and specific FMM, from our animal ancestors and hence biological FMM as such. In a very instructive polemic between M. Ruse and F. Ayala (2010, 297-336) on whether biological science can act as the explanatory basis for ethical teachings, for instance M. Ruse (ibid., 303) emphasizes that in our completely legitimate attempt to clarify the real determination of our behavior, we should avoid the extreme idea that it is entirely culturally determined, but also the equally extreme idea that it is determined purely biologically. However, similarly like Šmajs and Wilson, he immediately adds that morality was created during biological evolution and thus it is "an adaptation just as like hands, teeth, penises, and vaginas are." Ayala, on the other hand, also accepts that exceptional human intellectual abilities, including speech and the thinking were formed during biological evolution, or natural selection, but that they are specific characteristics of humans as a unique biological species, whose ethical behavior is initially determined culturally and is strongly varied by the specific cultural affiliations of the particular individual, who, just thank to it, can anticipate and evaluate the consequences of their behavior.
According to F. Ayala (ibid., 323) our ability to predict the future is the most important component of our ethical behavior and genetically is closely related to our ability to create more sophisticated and efficient tools (and machines), and this ability was and is an essential condition of our biological and sociocultural living. Equally interesting is Ayala's argument (ibid., 324) that our ability to make value judgments is directly related to our highly developed abstract thinking. This allows us to integrate events and things into classes, then compare and evaluate them according to their usefulness, goodness or beauty, which is in stark contrast to the claims of many current ecophilosophers about the existence of some sort of intrinsic value of nature, unless we go further than M. Král (in Šmajs 2012, 60) and admit that elementary particles, atomic nuclei, atoms and molecules are not only de facto identical with genes, but also with memes as basic units of cultural information. In terms of our current theme, however, the findings F. Ayala published in his next study (2008) are more important. On page 234 he states that culture, a specific human adaptation to the external environment, is much more successful than other types of biological adaptation mainly because it allows not only vertical but also horizontal transmission of information.
However, on the pages that follow (ibid., 247-249) he increasingly comes close to our definition of culture as a part of social FMM, which is a natural continuation of biological evolution, noting first that in the case of culture we are dealing with a new kind of evolution, i.e. adaptation with the help of technological means, so culture-based human evolution is carried out by means which "are not strictly biological." The transmission of cultural information takes place through suprabiological heredity, and thus finally passes to the platform of primarily cultural determination of human behaviour. He states that (ibid., 251) "during the last few million years people have adapted their environment to their genes rather than their genes adapting to their environment." On this basis, we can say that human nature (or essence) is in fact mainly sociocultural, and the psychological aspect is like a bridge (Poršnev 1979, 144-145) between the biological and the sociocultural. Most importantly, this essence is not given once and forever, but is historical, and therefore limited by being created, as well as possibly terminated in the form of more advanced, supersocial FMM and even its preliminary determination may fundamentally change our view not only of humans, but also, and especially, of nature itself.
And nature is thus not only non-living and living, but might also be social and cultural
If we subsequently accept the following: that the information content of different developmental levels in the cosmos (Chaisson 2000, 40) is directly related to the density of their ongoing energy flows, denoted by symbol Φ 9 ; that thanks to the analytical function of language or speech (Poršnev 1979, 288 ) the "distance of perception" has greatly "expanded in man" (i. e. the quantity and quality of information he obtains); that despite Šmajs' arguments (or even warnings) people are increasingly infiltrating the implicate order of nature and learning its "secrets" (for example, through very generously funded biotechnological and nanotechnological research), then nothing prevents us from defining social FMM as the final "link" in the intracosmic developmental order, namely development in cosmos or, in other words, nature itself. This is because we can only relate to it our short and long-term goals, our most important desires, aims and dreams without forcibly axiologizing and humanizing it by adding purely human attributes to it, which is typical of proponents of strongly anthropocentric, and not (only) biocentric, "hypotheses" about the existence of Gaia or Mother Earth; even if we had to do it at the expense of the lighthearted abandonment of manifold traditional and mutually exclusive (or overlapping) definitions of nature itself. 10 Being aware of the depth and the scope of such a radical paradigmatic, literally Copernican, shift in the perception of the issue, i.e. nature itself, which thus need not simply consist of non-living and living nature, but may also include all social FMM, which has so far been able to reproduce itself within the ERS. As such it can further develop or change to another better organized FMM only if it is to accelerate and intensify its growth rather than significantly reducing its cultural activities, so that these activities could be transferred to the solar system, thus preventing a definitive collapse or a termination of the intracosmic developmental order, which sooner or later must happen on each resource limited habitable terrestrial planet. These are, of course, ideas that rarely attract a positive response from radical philosophical naturalists, who recognize only non-living and living nature and firmly believe, as does E. O. Wilson (ibid., 83 ) that "there is a limit, perhaps closer to the practices of contemporary societies than we have had the wit to grasp, beyond which biological evolution will begin to pull cultural evolution back to itself", or L. Trilling who, in a similar vein to Šmajs (in Wilson, ibid., 83) , says that: "there is a hard, irreducible, stubborn core of biological urgency, and biological necessity, and biological reason, that culture cannot reach and that reserves the right, which sooner or later it will exercise, to judge the culture and resist and revise it." 11 We can expect much more relevant and interesting points of criticism or objections (such as those that might be heard from the dark depths of the ecophilosophical "ghetto") to come from philosophers of the mind. Nowadays they are dominated (Nosek 1997) by researchers who are more or less convinced that human consciousness, or the mind, essentially overlap (or are identical) with the activity of the human brain itself, and if we can accurately mimic or reproduce this activity, we will be on the way to finally solving the psycho-physical problem and explaining the true nature of human consciousness and the mind. As the attentive reader certainly apprehends, we cannot accept even this version of radical philosophical naturalism. Unlike philosophers such as J. Searle (2007, 63) who do not hesitate to claim that human consciousness is only a biological process "that takes place in the brain," and thus is the same process as "digestion, which takes place in the stomach or the rest of the digestive tract," we distinguish between human consciousness as a specific disposition of the human brain and the subject and the mind as a set of processes that can be implemented on the basis of the consciousness or against its "background".
We thus consider the mind per se to be an intersubjective phenomenon par excellence, because it is evoked and maintained by human speech, in its internal form (in the form of internal speech), as well as in its external form (in the form of external speech or communication). It is clear that we consider in advance as hopeless the attempts of researchers who believe that they will manage to reproduce the mind using a computer, or a high-tech lab without taking into account the mind's sociocultural grounding and determination. In other words, if we really want to overcome the human and create a strong artificial intelligence as a new supersocial FMM (which we can then integrate into or cooperate with, etc.), we must first recognize our own evolutionary limitations, which are increasingly limiting us as intelligent agents, including our mortality, commitment to the earth matter-energy-information resources etc., and then focus mainly on the creation of more autonomous intelligent agents who leave their native planet and with a light step move on into the glowing Galaxy.
Concluding remarks
In this paper we have considered it useful to focus not on the number of sub-problems arising from Šmajs' evolutionary ontology, but rather on the essence of his evolutionaryontological concept, which, we think, is just another variation of the extreme escalation of philosophical naturalism.
As can be seen in our critical contribution, Šmajs' philosophizing, not only in his book analyzed here (2012), but also throughout his work, goes around in circles, because he defines culture as being something fundamentally different from nature, but on the other hand defines culture as being basically identical with nature, because he simultaneously identifies man with culture and at the same time defines man as a biological species-and thus part of nature itself.
Inconspicuously and apparently unintentionally he transfers several negative human qualities (aggression, maladjustment, impatience, hedonism, etc.) to culture, and thus he deprives man of his ecological "guilt", but he also degrades the position of man as a sovereign subject of his own history to being a mere appendix of nature that will eventually have to submit to a strongly anthropomorphized Nature or Mother Earth, and significantly limit his activities.
Šmajs repeatedly identifies nature with natural evolution, to which he transfers many properties of biological evolution as a whole and as a result the non-living FMM start to acquire properties of living systems (for example, genetic memory, etc.), while existing intracosmic developmental order, consisting of at least ten FMMs, becomes merely a cluster of undifferentiated and principally indistinguishable forms of movement. He repeatedly simplifies and "flattens" the intricate and complex general developmental (or globalevolutionary) issue, but this cannot be done without, as D. Storch (ibid., 627) has stated, modifying or adjusting crucial general scientific concepts or entire scientific conceptions into a form that suits him, as we tried to show in the example of his most commonly used term (or concept) of evolution in general. In his concept of "entropy" he completely leaves aside the fact that apart from entropy, physicists (and cosmologists) talk about thermal and gravitational entropy, which may compensate each other during their simultaneous growth or decline (Reeves 1993) and entropy as such then does not have to be perceived as a global cosmic destructive process.
Many ecophilosophers who use the concept of entropy in an equally arbitrary and tendentious manner may be surprised by the unexpected findings of P. Landsberg (1984) , who states that in thermodynamics it is possible to formally separate disorder and entropy and within the expanding universe then allocate a period in which entropy and order simultaneously increase, not to mention his modified Robertson-Walker model of our cosmos (ibid., 2), where order can even systematically grow in constant entropy.
Šmajs repeatedly identifies biological evolution with non-existent biotic evolution, or with a parallel and closely linked evolution of the Earth's geosphere and biosphere, thus rejecting all established definitions of biological evolution, which he believes (Šmajs 2009, 327) are "reduced to genetic variability and natural selection which are hard for the public to grasp," although in the recent and current evolutionary-biological literature we find many authors, who, while identifying the main characteristics of biological evolution, do not remain at the level of microevolution.
V. Stanko (1989, 711-713) states that progress in living nature cannot be registered at the population and species level, as that is only where organisms adapt to the environment; it is registered at the biocenosis level, where individual species assert themselves mainly because of their increasing versatility and autonomy. B. Rosslenbroich (2009, 623) implicitly agrees with this, arguing that the most important innovation in the realm of living lies in the increased autonomy of organisms "in the sense of their emancipation from the environment".
Šmajs' inclination towards radical philosophical naturalism can finally be seen in his repeated assertions about the existence of human biological nature, which determines or preconditions our behaviour. While we believe it would be more appropriate to talk about human essence as a set of characteristics that make us fundamentally different from other living creatures (for instance, human speech, mind and material production), as is evident even from the very different attitudes of different cultures or societies to the issue of human homosexuality.
We believe, therefore, that at this point we can conclude our arguments by stating that in his recent evolutionary-ontological writing (2012) J. Šmajs actually presents himself as a radical philosophical naturalist and indeed, as D. Storch notices (ibid., 627), modifies crucial general scientific concepts in order to confirm his starting hypotheses.
Despite all these critical objections, we evaluate Šmajs' philosophical work very positively, as we appreciate the fact that, unlike some of the "cabinet" philosophers who have built their philosophical "business" on the analysis of Heidegger's philosophical speculations, J. Šmajs has focused on the actual problem, i. e. the problem of our disrupted relationship to the environment, and his tireless efforts have finally paved the way for researchers who may take up the challenge of finding its substantive solution.
